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Byrd: No Squeezing, No Cornering: Some Rules for Commodity Exchanges

NO SQUEEZING, NO CORNERING:
SOME RULES FOR COMMODITY EXCHANGES
The "temporary emergency rules"'1 promulgated under the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 19742 authorize
commodity exchanges to take various measures to prevent commodity futures market manipulation. 3 However, these rules may
bp ineffective if the commodity exchanges have discretion over
their enforcement. For decades, commodity exchanges had the
means to prevent various types of market manipulation, 4 but often
5
ignored the problem or imposed penalties for completed conduct.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 1.41(f) (1978) provides in part:
In the event of an emergency, a contract market, by a two-thirds vote of its
governing board, may place into immediate effect a temporary emergency

rule to deal with the emergency without prior Commission approval...:
(3) A temporary emergency rule may provide for, or may authorize the
contract market . ..to undertake actions necessary or appropriate to meet
the emergency, including, but not limited to, such actions as:
(i) Limiting trading to liquidation only, in whole or in part, or limiting
trading to liquidation only except for new sales by parties who have the
commodity to deliver pursuant to such sales;
(ii) Extending or shortening the expiration date for trading in contracts;
(iii) Extending the time of delivery;
(iv) Changing delivery points;
(v) Ordering the liquidation of contracts, the fixing of a settlement price
or the reduction in positions;
(vi) Ordering the transfer of contracts, and the money, securities, and
property securing such contracts, held on behalf of customers by a member
of the contract market to another member, or other members, of the contract
market willing to assume such contracts or obligated to do so;
(vii) Extending, limiting or changing hours of trading;
(viii) Suspending trading; and
(ix) Modifying or suspending any provision of the rules of the contract
market.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (1976)).
3. Before passage of the 1974 Act, federal regulations provided little control
over essential exchange functions, such as dealing with emergency situations
involving the threat of market manipulation. Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REv. 710, 718 (1975).
4. See notes 113-114 infra and accompanying text.
5. See text accompanying notes 26-29 infra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1979],
Art.7: 6923

This Note examines those forms of market manipulation amenable to preventive regulation, focuses on the inequities of judicial

resolution of -manipulation, and proposes a course of action to protect commodity market operation from the inconsistent approaches
previously taken by commodity exchanges.
FUNCTIONS OF THE EXCHANGE

A commodity exchange is a marketplace through which contracts are made for the future delivery6 of a specified quantity and

grade of a particular commodity. Each contract must be confirmed
by a cash deposit called a "margin," 7 after which a "clearinghouse"
is substituted as buyer from the seller and as seller to the buyer. 8
Thereafter, each of the contracting parties is obligated only to the
clearinghouse.
A commodity futures contract must either be satisfied by acceptance or delivery of the actual commodity during the delivery
month, 9 or liquidated by entering into an exactly opposite and
equal offsetting contract through the same broker, in the same future, prior to the specified delivery date.' 0 Approximately ninety6. Delivery is usually permitted during any one of 12 successive calendar
months. In some markets the outside limit may be 18 months in the future. J. BAER
& 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 140-41 (1949). See
generally T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 4041 (2d ed. 1977).
The seller has the entire trading month that is specified in the contract to make delivery. J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra, at 141. However, the seller must give the buyer
notice of impending delivery at least one business day in advance. 1 CoMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 6335 (1979).
7. See 1 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 315, at 1059 (1974).
8. The volume of trading and duration of the contract make a direct contract between two individuals impractical. Exchanges have developed corporations to reconcile and assure the financial integrity of futures transactions. J. BAER & 0. SAXON,
supra note 6, at 164, 168, 182. See generally 1 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 315
(1974); T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 45.
9. When a futures contract is satisfied by delivery, delivery is effectuated by
seller's tender and buyer's acceptance of a warehouse receipt covering a specified
quantity and grade of a particular commodity stored in a designated warehouse approved by the exchange. The full cash contract price must then be paid. T.
HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 37, 46.
10. For example, a standard corn contract involves the purchase or sale of 5000
bushels of corn. If a trader had bought one contract of corn for May delivery ("May
corn"), that trader would have to accept delivery of the warehouse receipts for 5000
bushels of corn before the end of May or liquidate by selling one contract of May
corn (through the same broker who had executed the buy contract) prior to the end
of May. Likewise if a trader had sold ten contracts of May corn (involving 50,000
bushels) that trader would have to deliver the warehouse receipts for 50,000 bushels
of corn before the end of May or liquidate by buying ten contracts of May corn
through the same broker who had executed the sell contract, before the end of May.
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nine percent of futures contracts are offset by opposite transactions
before the delivery date." Profits or losses are determined by the
difference between each party's buy price and sell price minus the
broker's commission.' 2 A trader who fails to offset or deliver is in
default on the contract.13
Commodity futures trading serves several economic functions. 14 Farmers use futures contracts to spread the sale of seasonal
crops over many months, alleviating the uncertainty of supply and
demand and resulting price fluctuations at the end of a harvest season. 15 In addition, a commodity producer or a dealer in the actual
or "cash" commodity who has not yet made a cash sale may want
protection from a decline in price before the sale is complete. This
producer or dealer will "hedge"'16 actual inventory against any
11. See 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE GRAIN TRADE 185 (1920) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]; J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 6, at 138; T.

HIERONYM-JS, supra note 6, at 4; Campbell, Trading In Futures Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 215, 217 (1958).
12. Broker fees vary with the exchange, among brokerage houses, and according to services provided. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 354-57. See generally 1
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 315, at 1060 (1974).
13. Exchanges have varying regulations regarding default. Generally, if the
buyer defaults, the seller has the right to sell the commodity in the open market and
charge any losses to the buyer. If the seller defaults, the value of the commodity is
determined by a board on the exchange and the seller is charged a penalty, usually 5
to 10% of the commodity's value as determined by the board. See T. HIERONYMUS,
supra note 6, at 37. See also 5 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 187.
14.

See 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 207-20; J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra

note 6, at 27-50; 1 CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 306 (1974); T. HIERONYMUS, supra
note 6, at 173-97; Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in Trading on Organized
Exchanges, 27 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1937); Working, Futures Trading and Hedging,
43 AM. ECON. REv. 314, 314-17 (1953); Note, supra note 3, at 711-15; Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 823-30 (1951).
15. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). See generally sources cited note 14 supra.
16. See 7 FTC REPORT, supranote 11, at 207; J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supranote 6, at
197-218; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 175-200; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC., THE MERRILL LYNCH GUIDE TO HEDGING (1978) [hereinafter cited as MERRILL LYNCH GUIDE]; Working, supra note 14, at 314. See also 1

Comm.FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 306, at 1051 (1974). The uncertainties involved in the
production and sale of commodities and the concomitant price fluctuations can produce both windfall profits and devastating losses. The hedger exchanges the possibility of windfall profits for the security of a fixed price. Hedging enables a commodity producer or dealer to calculate prospective profits without the danger of a price
change by the time the actual commodity is delivered or received. The following
illustrates how hedging protects a farmer:
Suppose you are a corn producer in Iowa and you expect to have a crop
that will yield 50,000 bushels of corn. In June, you check futures prices for
September and see that corn for that month is quoted at $3.00 a bushel. This
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price would provide you with a fair profit if you could be sure of getting it
when your crop is ready for delivery.
Here's how you can make sure of getting that price:
" Since each corn contract calls for 5,000 bushels, you sell 10 September futures contracts.
Now, no matter whether corn prices go up or down, you are
assured of your fair profit when you sell your 50,000 bushels.
* If prices should drop from $3.00 a bushel to $2.70, you would receive $15,000 less for your crop than you wanted.
But on your 10 futures contracts, you would make a profit of
$1,500 per contract, or $15,000. So the net result would be the
same as if corn prices had remained steady at $3.00 a bushel.
The same is true if prices rise by 300 a bushel. You would receive
$15,000 more for your crop but you would have a loss in the futures market
of $15,000. So again, the net result is the same as if the $3.00 a bushel price
had stayed steady.
Hedging need not change your usual business procedures unless you
want to change them. You would probably not deliver your crop to the
Chicago futures market to meet your obligation. You would simply offset
your futures contract by buying 10 September contracts and you would sell
your production in the same way you normally sell it.
On the other hand, if you were a corn dealer and you had forward commitments to sell at $3.00, you would do the opposite of what the producer
did to obtain protection in the futures market. You would:
* Buy 10 contracts of September corn at $3.00. If prices should rise
to $3.30 a bushel at the time you complete your transaction, you
would lose 300 a bushel in the cash market. But you would make a
profit of 300 a bushel on your futures contracts so your position would
be just where you wanted it to be.
* If prices should drop to $2.70 at delivery time, you would make
an extra 300 on your cash transaction, but this would be counterbalanced by a loss of 300 on your futures contracts.
MERRULL LYNCH GUrmE, supra, at 4-6. Likewise if you were a corn dealer who had
forward commitments to buy at $3.00 you would want to protect yourself against a
price decline just as you would if you were the corn producer protecting the sale
price of his coming harvest.
The above examples are idealized; other factors affect hedging. For example,
since futures contract sizes are standard, it may be difficult to trade quantities of futures that are identical to the quantities of the hedger's cash commodities. Rarely is a
hedger perfectly hedged. The hedger is usually "underhedged," partially speculating
in the cash commodity, or "overhedged," partially speculating in the futures market.
See generally id. at 4; see also Working, supra note 14, at 314. And, of course, a producer or a dealer always incurs some risk when deciding on a price to protect. The
price will afford one the expected profits only if there will be no unforeseen rise in
costs unrelated to the price of the commodity. For example, a hedger might calculate
that a price of three dollars per bushel for his corn will yield a profit of x percent
based on certain costs of storage, labor, fuel, fire insurance, etc. Profits may dwindle,
however, if these costs suddenly and unexpectedly increase. Nevertheless, because
hedging protects against major loss, it is indisputably a worthwhile form of insurance
for the producer or dealer. Recognizing this, bankers and lenders encourage, and occasionally require, hedging by individuals and companies that wish to use their commodity inventories as collateral for loans, often advancing a higher percentage of
the value of the commodity if it has been hedged. See MEREMLL LYNCH GUIDE,
supra, at 7.
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price decline by contracting to sell a quantity of commodity futures
identical to the quantity of cash commodity intended for sale. Because futures prices generally parallel cash prices, 17 any decline in
the price of the hedger's actual inventory by the time a purchaser
is found is gained back by the profit on the futures exchange when
the sell contract is offset with a buy contract. 18 Thus, trading in
commodity futures can serve as insurance 19 for the dealer in cash
commodities interested in protecting the price at which the actual
commodity is bought and sold, rather than speculating in price
changes for profit. Hedging reduces the effects of adverse price
movements, enabling a producer or dealer to operate on a lower
profit margin.
The speculator, on the other hand, is a trader willing to assume either a buy position ("long") or a sell position ("short") depending on whether prices are expected to rise or fall.2o Speculators provide a ready market for the dealer in the cash commodity
who wishes only to hedge.
Finally, the prices which result from the interplay between
longs and shorts, speculators and hedgers are disseminated
worldvide 2 l and influence the price of a commodity on the cash
22
market.
THE

PROBLEM: DEFINING MANIPULATION

For the futures market to perform its "insurance" function effectively, prices must reflect as nearly as possible the forces of sup17.

See 1 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)

305 (1974); T. HIERONYMUS, supra note

6, at 148-72.
18.

See note 16 supra.

19. For a discussion of the difference between insurance and hedging, see T.
HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 149-51.
20. Most small speculators go long; large speculators go either long or short.
Note, Prevention of Commodity Futures Manipulation Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1941).
21. At the end of 1975, Chicago Board of Trade quotations were received in 90
countries. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 35.
22. Although cash and futures markets are different, they are subject to the
same influences. Commodity exchanges are economic barometers of worldwide
weather conditions, political upheavals, labor unrest, consumer trends, and many
other factors affecting the supply/demand tug of war for any given cash commodity.
The price trends of both cash and futures markets therefore tend to move in the
same direction. Absent manipulation, this is especially true as the futures-trading
month draws near. As the expiration date approaches, prices are subject to progressively less uncertainty. Ultimately-in the absence of manipulation-as the future
becomes the present, cash and futures prices in the expiring contract converge.
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ply and demand. 2 3 Price manipulation impedes the market's performance of its basic economic functions, diminishing the market's
utility to those members of the trade and general public who rely
on that performance. 24
Because "It]he methods and techniques of manipulation are
limited only by the ingenuity of man," 25 it is difficult to design reg23. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1158 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972). See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 39 (1923); J. BAER & 0.
SAXON, supra note 6, at 197-250.
24. When the futures market is manipulated, the futures price is likely to be
distorted from its normal relationship with the prevailing cash commodity price. The
hedger faces an increased margin of risk if the hedger has to close out the hedge at a
time when the futures market is experiencing this distortion. Any monetary loss from
the resulting incomplete and inefficient hedging is passed on to the consuming public. See generally H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974). Further, fear of a
manipulated market has a demoralizing effect on all traders, resulting in widespread
avoidance of delivery-month trading. Trading liquidity is consequently lessened during the delivery month. This in turn contributes to the price distortion caused by a
squeeze or corner because there will be fewer traders, other than those parties who
are manipulating the price, through whom to liquidate. See notes 30-38 infra and accompanying text.
25. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972). See also David G. Henner Case, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971) (egg
futures purchased at unnecessarily high price at close of trading day to deceive traders relying on price-movement chart formations into thinking that following day
would be opportune time to buy). For criticism of chart-formation trading, see Irwin,
supra note 14, at 271-77. See also Howard Randolph Case, 21 Agric. Dec. 219 (1962)
(egg merchandiser deliberately caused floor broker on New York Mercantile Exchange to pay unnecessarily high purchase price for egg futures to produce higher
price for merchandiser's sale of cash eggs, price of which was based on price of egg
futures on day of delivery of cash eggs); Landon v. Butler Case, 14 Agric. Dec. 429
(1955) (cotton and grain merchandiser intentionally transmitted false information
about lack of deliverable supply of soybeans). For discussion of the effect that local
supply of certificated stock at the end of a delivery month can have on the price of
that month's commodity futures, see text accompanying notes 30-38 infra. See also
Ralph W. Moore Case, 9 Agric. Dec. 1299 (1950) (circulation of bogus "Memorandum
to the Press," purportedly endorsed by Department of Agriculture, containing false
and misleading information regarding government purchases of lard); Ruben Earl
McGuigan Case, 5 Agric. Dec. 249 (1946) (defendant assumed market position, then
advertised and represented himself to be in business of selling market advice to traders and sent out telegrams advising purchases and sales which would favorably affect
his position). A relatively common form of manipulation occurs when a floor broker,
allowed to trade for his or her own account as well as for other accounts, notices the
beginning of a price fluctuation and trades accordingly for his or her own benefit.
This dual trading by floor brokers adds momentum to otherwise minor price fluctuations, producing "mini-manipulations" throughout the trading day. For discussion of
floor broker malfeasance, see Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974:
Hearings on S.2485, S. 2578, S.2837, H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 207-24 (1974) (statement of Rep. Neal
Smith) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Note, supra note 3, at 730-39. For
discussion of how loopholes in current law give foreign governments the potential to
manipulate United States commodity futures prices, see id. at 747-48.
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ulations to anticipate and prevent every conceivable case of manipulation. Thus, sections 6b 2 6 and 927 of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 28 as amended, proscribe deceptive and manipulative practices
29
in general terms. Stiff penalties are imposed for violations.
The only way to dictate a manipulated price is through the use
of a squeeze or a comer. A squeeze develops when, toward the
end of a delivery month, a dominant long30 apparently wishes to
take delivery on contracts rather than offset the price and the local
supply of certificated stock3 is insufficient to meet this delivery.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (original version at ch. 369, § 6b, 42 Stat. 998 (1922))
(civil penalty for manipulation) which provides in part:
If the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission has reason to believe
that any person.., is manipulating or attempting to manipulate or has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity...
it may serve upon such person a complaint stating its charges in that respect
...
requiring such person to show cause why an order should not be made
prohibiting it from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market,
and directing that all contract markets refuse all trading privileges to such
person, until further notice of the Commission, and to show cause why the
registration of such person, if registered as futures commission merchant or
any person associated therewith ....
commodity trading advisor, commodity
pool operator, or as floor broker hereunder, should not be suspended or revoked.... Upon evidence received, the Commission may prohibit such person from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market and require all contract markets to refuse such person all trading privileges
thereon for such period as may be specified in the order, and, if such person
is registered as futures commission merchant . . . . commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, or as floor broker hereunder, may suspend,
for a period not to exceed six months, or revoke, the registration of such person, and may assess such person a civil penalty of not more than $100,000
for each such violation.
27. Id. § 13 (1976) (original version at ch. 369, § 9, 42 Stat. 998 (1922)) (criminal
penalty for manipulation) which provides in part:
It shall be a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $100,000 or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs
of prosecution, for any person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the
price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market ....
28. Id. §§ 1-22 (1976) (originally enacted as Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat.
998 (1922) (retitled "Commodity Exchange Act" by Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, 49
Stat. 1491)).
29. Violators may lose trading privileges and face fines, id. § 9 (1976), and/or
jail sentences, id. § 13.
30. A "dominant long" is a long who controls a sufficient number of contracts
to enable him or her to dominate the market and exact an arbitrary price for his or
her contracts. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1164 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Arguably the last long or short in the market in any expiring future is dominant; however, this argument was rejected in Cargill.Id.
31. Before a commodity can be delivered it must be certificated as being of the
proper grade. See id. at 1157; J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 6, at 86-95. See generally T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 33, 46.
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The shorts, finding no other sellers from whom to buy the needed
commodity to liquidate their positions, and unable or unwilling to
acquire the certificated stock necessary for delivery on the contracts, can then avoid default only by outbidding each other in an
effort to persuade the dominant long to sell the contracts back to
them. The resulting, albeit temporary, high price for futures does
not reflect true supply and demand, but merely a phenomenon peculiar to the particular delivery month. Natural squeezes may develop when the shortage in the delivery month occurs by chance
and the long's commitments require that delivery be taken on the
futures positions. 3 2 However, when knowledge of a shortage of deliverable supplies tempts a long into increasing the long position
and apparently standing for delivery when the only purpose is to
exact an exaggerated price from panicked shorts, the squeeze is
considered manipulative and a cause for disciplinary action arises
33
against the long.
A comer in the futures market differs from a squeeze in that
the "shortage" of deliverable stock results from a dominant long
having secured ownership of that stock. 34 While there may be an
abundance of actual deliverable stock, most of it is owned by
the party with the dominant long interests in the futures market.
This situation is analogous to a squeeze. However, instead of an actual shortage of deliverable stock, there is only a shortage of deliverable stock not controlled by the dominant long. Thus, the long is
in a position to dictate both the price of liquidation for the shorts
and the purchase price of the deliverable commodity. 3 5 Natural
comers may develop when the owner of most of the stock acquired
it for bona fide sales purposes and commitments require that deliv-

32. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972); 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 243; J. BAER & 0. SAXON,
supra note 6, at 83.

33. See, e.g., Volkart Bros. Case, 20 Agric. Dec. 306 (1961), vacated, 311 F.2d
52 (5th Cir. 1962).

34. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 6, at 83; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note
6, at 321-28. See also Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 242-44.
35. See note 30 supra. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1962); G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959); Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); General Foods Corp. v. Brannan,
170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938). See also
How Jack Simplot, Other Big Traders Waged a Potato War, Wall St. J., June 1, 1976,
at 1, col. 1 (describing "Maine potato scandal").
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ery be taken on the futures contracts. 36 However, if after acquiring
a dominant interest in the deliverable cash commodity, the owner
increases the long position and stands for delivery to exact an artificial price from panicked shorts, the corner, like the squeeze, 37 is
considered manipulative and a cause for disciplinary action arises
38
against the long.
Occasionally the shorts try to squeeze the longs by tendering
large numbers of delivery notices early in the delivery month,
hoping the longs will panic and liquidate rather than accept deliveries. Theoretically this pushes prices down, enabling the shorts to
buy back at a lower price. 3 9 Conceivably, the mere possibility of
this scheme is one cause of manipulative corners: Longs accumu-

late large holdings of deliverable supplies trying to defend their fu-

tures positions against such tactics by the shorts. 40 Nevertheless,
when the longs successfully defend themselves and strike back at
the shorts by standing for further deliveries, the longs may become
41
subject to disciplinary action.
36. See 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 243. But see J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 6, at 82.
37. The terms "squeeze" and "corner" are sometimes confused. See generally
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962). This is because a pure
squeeze, one in which there are no deliverable supplies whatsoever, virtually never
occurs. Because there are usually some supplies when there is a squeeze, these sup"plies must be "cornered." Thus, in practice, a squeeze usually involves some smallscale "cornering." See generally 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 242-44; J. BAER &
0. SAXON, supra note 6, at 83.
38. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962);
G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 907 (1959); Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th
Cir. 1948); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938); see also How Jack Simplot,
Other Big Traders Waged a Potato War, Wall St. J., June 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1
(describing "Maine potato scandal").
39. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 325; Comment, Manipulationof Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 94, 102 (1953).
See generally Hohenberg Bros. Cotton Co. Case, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,146 (1976). The shorts are incapable of employing the
equivalent of a long-side squeeze or corner. The effectiveness of a squeeze or corner
turns on the long's ability to seize an advantage when there is an insufficient supply
of goods available to sellers. For the seller to accomplish an analogous manipulation
would require that he or she force a situation wherein there is an insufficient number of buyers for the oversupply of goods. This is impractical if not difficult or impossible to accomplish in any one delivery month, because if the price goes too low
in relation to the other months there will generally be buyers ready to take advantage of the bargain. See 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 254.
40.

See generally T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 325-26.

41. Id. See generally cases cited note 35 supra.
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Given these market realities, cornering or squeezing can be
properly characterized as manipulative only when (1) traders become aware that their trading behavior is likely to result in a corner or squeeze and they nevertheless persist in that behavior, and
(2) the trading behavior is not consistent with any legitimate business purpose. Only then will traders have the requisite knowledge
and intent to impute culpability for market manipulation. But such
knowledge or intent can rarely be shown unless traders are definitively informed that a corner or squeeze will likely result from
their trading behavior. Therefore defining manipulation in terms of
cornering or squeezing can be counterproductive. This is illustrated by the inequitable and inconsistent results reached by the
42
various courts that have dealt with corners or squeezes.
Variations in Court and Administrative Decisions
Although cornering and squeezing4 3 are prohibited by the
Commodity Exchange Act,44 they are never specifically defined.4 5
Since definition has been left to judicial and administrative construction, it was inevitable that conflicting standards and tests for
manipulation would emerge. 46 The lack of a coherent definition
leaves an aggressive, large-scale trader guessing at what point financial self-interest violates the act.
General Foods Corp. v. Brannan4 7 is the first appellate decision to construe the term "manipulate" in the Commodity Exchange Act. General Foods Corporation allegedly cornered the rye
futures market from December 1942 through May 1944. General
Foods took delivery of 7,230,000 bushels of rye in satisfaction of
futures contracts and allegedly "caused a tight situation in the
Chicago rye market, with a resulting inflated and manipulated
price." 48 After the Business Conduct Committee of the Chicago
Board of Trade warned General Foods that such holdings might
42.

See text accompanying notes 43-108 infra.

43. While squeezing is not expressly prohibited by the Act, it is clearly implicated because, in practice, all squeezing involves some cornering. See note 37 supra.
44. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (original version at ch. 369, § 66, 42 Stat. 998 (1922))
(civil penalty for manipulation); id. § 13 (1976) (original version at ch. 369, § 9, 42
Stat. 998 (1922)) (criminal penalty for manipulation). For text of statutes, see notes 26
& 27 supra.
45. See Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (retitled "Commodity
Exchange Act" by Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491) (current version at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
46. See generally text accompanying notes 47-108 infra.
47. 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948).
48. Id. at 222.
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tend to create a corner and that no further purchases were to be
made by General Foods without permission of the committee, 49 associates of General Foods, also named as defendants in the case,
bought large numbers of additional rye futures and took delivery
on approximately 2,000,000 more bushels. 50
At the administrative hearing, 5 ' the judicial officer construed
"manipulate" to mean causing prices "to go up or down by means
directed to either such end or to prevent prices from going up or
down by means directed to such end."5 2 However, there was no
53
testimony regarding the normal, unmanipulated price of rye.
Nevertheless, based on inferences drawn from defendants' trading
activities and' incriminating statements, 5 4 the judicial officer found
that General Foods and its associates had manipulated the market
55
in violation of sections 6b and 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, refused to draw
the same inferences and emphasized that the government never
contended that the transactions by defendants had any effect upon
the price other than to "stabilize" it at a particular level. 5 6 The
court of appeals concluded that manipulation does not include the
mere "stabilization" of a "natural" price but rather "the creation of
an artificial price." 57 Thus, the order of the judicial officer was set
aside, 58 not because of insufficient evidence, but rather because
the court of appeals defined the crime differently.
Both opinions ignored the shorts' role in the market manipulation. If General Foods and its associates had reached their capacity
to accept deliveries while still holding open positions in expiring
futures, they would have been forced to liquidate their remaining
long futures contracts by selling, 59 thereby contributing to a price
decline. It is plausible that those shorts still in the market during
49.

Id.

50. Id.
51. General Foods Corp. Case, 6 Agric. Dec. 288 (1947), vacated, 170 F.2d 220
(7th Cir. 1948). Upon allegations of market manipulation an administrative hearing is
held, the outcome of which may be reviewed in the federal court of appeals for the
circuit in which the petitioner is doing business. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (civil penalty for manipulation).
52. 6 Agric. Dec. at 305.
53. Id. at 297.
54. Id. at 313-15.
55. Id.
56. 170 F.2d at 230.
57. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 231.
59. Otherwise they would have defaulted on their contracts. See note 13 supra.
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the final days of the delivery month were holding their positions in
anticipation of such an impending profitable price collapse that
never occurred. The trading activities of the shorts contributed to
the manipulation. Therefore, it is possible that the artificial price
was as much a result of the shorts' market activity as the longs' activity.
The failure of the Commodity Exchange Act to specifically define the elements of manipulation proved troublesome for the court
in General Foods.60 Official market surveillance by two representatives of the Commodity Exchange Administration who bad vast experience with grain exchanges did not detect any irregularities or
perceive any need for regulatory preventive measures. 61 Although
the Seventh Circuit did not dismiss the charges on vagueness
grounds, 62 the court nevertheless evidenced concern:
Of course, [the failure of Commodity Exchange Administration
representatives to invoke regulatory measures] does not impair
the right of the government to proceed as it has, but at the same
time, we think it casts some reflection upon a determination
made long subsequent to the happening of the events relied
upon, that respondents attempted to manipulate or corner the
market when no such activity was discernible by the agencies'
own experienced men, who viewed and understood the situation
at close range and while respondents' activities were in prog63
ress.
Although this concern was voiced obliquely and seemed peripheral
to the court's final decision, it was undoubtedly one factor influencing the ultimate outcome. 64
The issue of the shorts' involvement in the manipulation was
also ignored in Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan,6 5 the next major case to involve an alleged manipulative corner. Again, the issue of lack of notice about what conduct constitutes a violation was dismissed. 66 Great Western concerned an
alleged corner in, and manipulation of, the December 1947 egg futures market. During November and December of 1947, Great
Western and associates purchased large quantities of December
egg futures. Simutaneously, they purchased large enough quanti60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See 170 F.2d at 224.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See generally id. at 231.
201 F.2d. 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
See generally id. at 484.
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ties of actual or "cash" eggs so that when it came time for Great
Western to take delivery in satisfaction of its futures contracts, it
allegedly controlled the entire supply of deliverable eggs in
Chicago and surrounding areas. 67 At the administrative hearing,
"manipulation" was found to include "the effecting of a price which
would be different if the price influencing efforts were absent, that
is, not only the raising or lowering of price by means directed to
either such end but the prevention of prices from going up or
down according to free supply and demand conditions."6 8 Using
this definition of manipulation, Great Western was found to have
violated section 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act. 69
On appeal, however, no specific definition of manipulation was
articulated: The Seventh Circuit found intentional cornering coupled with higher than "normal" prices sufficient to uphold the decision below. 70 By comparing the statistical price patterns of January
1948 futures and fresh eggs with the price of the allegedly manipulated December 1947 egg futures, it was "proved" that prices were
abnormally high in December. 71 In addition, the court found the
price of futures abnormally high in relation to supply and demand. 72 The finding of manipulative intent was based upon statements by one of the defendants to the effect that the trading program was initiated for the purpose of obtaining higher prices for
December futures. 73 The court thus narrowly construed the critical
issue: whether and how Great Western actually caused the price
changes.
As in General Foods, it was only because the defendant longs
won the pricing tug of war that they were charged with market ma67. Id. at 478.
68. Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. Case, 10 Agric. Dec. 783, 815 (1951), appeal

denied, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
69. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976) (original version at ch. 369, § 9, 42 Stat. 998 (1922))
(criminal penalty for manipulation).

70. See 201 F.2d at 479, 483.
71. Id. at 482. While such criteria is not completely inapposite, any "proof" of
price abnormality based on comparisons between past and present price patterns is
fundamentally unreliable. If "proper" prices could be predicted with certainty from

past market behavior, schools of market statisticians would be able to trade without
fear of mistake. See generally Irwin, supra note 14, at 270-77. Because there are so
many factors affecting supply and demand at any given time, it is difficult to prove
price abnormality based on comparisons between past and present prices, different
futures prices, or futures and cash prices without examining minutely all the circumstances surrounding the various prices. See generally T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6,

at 148-72.
72. 201 F.2d at 482.
73. Id. at 484.
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nipulation; the court paid no heed to the likelihood that there had
been shorts in the market who held their positions too long in expectation of an eventual price collapse. 74 Furthermore, since it was
never shown that the defendants ever controlled more than fiftyone percent of Chicago's deliverable supply, 75 many of the shorts
who paid the inflated liquidation prices may have done so because
they had neither the intention nor the financial capability of obtaining the deliverable eggs even at an acceptable price, and not
because they could only get the eggs at Great Western's prohibitve
prices. They therefore had to liquidate at any price or default on
their contracts.
The court noted that petitioners protested the lack of notice of
the specific charges filed against them by citing the Administrative
Procedure Act requirement that:
Except in cases of willfulness ...

no ... suspension ...

of

any license shall be lawful unless, prior to the institution of
agency proceedings therefor, facts or conduct which may warrant
such action shall have been called to the attention of the licensee
by the agency in writing and the licensee shall have been accorded opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with
76
all lawful requirements.
The court dismissed this defense holding that the petitioners' acts
77
were "willful" because they intentionally set out to raise prices.
But this response begs the question. The intent, purpose, and expectation of all speculators is to make a profit. Consequently, they
cannot reasonably be expected to curtail their own trading behavior
in the absence of clear guidelines if such a curtailment limits or
jeopardizes their profits. 78 Thus, assuming arguendo that Great
Western and associates traded in a manner that they hoped would
raise prices and did in fact do so, it does not necessarily follow that
they willfully set out to manipulate the market.7 9 Given the ambi74. See text accompanying note 59 supra. See generally Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a Definition, 6 HoFSTRA L. Ruv. 41,

50-55 (1977).
75. 201 F.2d at 481.
76. Id. at 484 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1008 (1952) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 558

(1976))).
77. Id.
78. A long's purpose in accepting delivery instead of liquidating may not be to
control the deliverable supply, but to refrain from exerting downward pressure on
the futures' price. See generally text accompanying note 59 supra.

79. There is no evidence that Great Western knew, or had reason to know, that
its conduct was "manipulative."
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guity of the term "manipulation," only if the longs had been
warned that their trading conduct was becoming manipulative and
they persisted nevertheless could it be contended that they willfully manipulated the market.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Volkart Brothers v. Freeman,8 0
decided nine years after Great Western, reflects an uneasiness
about imposing sanctions for violating an undefined prohibition
against manipulation and the role of the shorts in producing market
distortion.8 1 Volkart involved alleged squeezing of the October
1957 cotton futures market by Volkart Brothers, a large cottonmerchandising corporation. On the last day of trading in October
cotton futures, Volkart held 104 long contracts 2 representing
eighty-nine percent of the total open interest 8 3 in cotton futures on
the New York Cotton Exchange. Volkart allegedly exacted an arbitrary and manipulated liquidation price from the shorts by taking advantage of an insufficient local supply of certificated cotton available
for delivery. At both the administrative hearing8 4 and on appeal,
"manipulation" was defined as " 'any and every operation or transaction or practice . . . calculated to produce a price distortion of
any kind in any market either in itself or in relation to other markets. . . . Any . . . operation, transaction [or] device employed to
produce these abnormalities of price relationship in the futures
markets is manipulation.' "85 On review, however, the Fifth Circuit decided that to constitute manipulation, Volkart would have
had to intend to create the shortage of deliverable stock and to
exploit the shortage for its own profit.8 6 The court defined "manipulate" to include conduct calculated to produce a price distortion
and not merely the charging of "unreasonably high" prices.8 7 Otherwise, the statute prohibiting "manipulation" would be arguably
unconstitutional as failing " 'to inform persons accused of violation
80.
81.
82.

311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
See generally text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
Volkart Bros. Case, 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 307 (1961), vacated, 311 F.2d 52

(5th Cir. 1962).
83. "Open interest" refers to the number of unsettled contracts. T. HIERONYMtuS, supra note 6, at 42.
84. Volkart Bros. Case, 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 339 (1961), vacated, 311 F.2d 52

(5th Cir. 1962).
85. 311 F.2d at 58 (quoting Hearings Before Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on
Agriculture and Forestry, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 201-02 (1927) (testimony of Arthur R.

Marsh, former President, New York Cotton Exchange)).
86.

Id. at 59.

87. Id. at 58.
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thereof of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.' "8
Because Volkart did not create the shortage of certificated cotton,
but only exploited it, the court set aside the judicial officer's order. 8 9
Furthermore, the court believed that the shorts' own lack of
due diligence in preparing for delivery contributed to their
untenable position in the futures market. The court noted that
while there had been a shortage of certificated cotton, large supplies of uncertificated cotton had been stored in the port warehouses specified as delivery points for certificated cotton.9 0 Because the shorts could have obtained this cotton and certificated it
in time for delivery, the court refused to disregard the availability
of these supplies in measuring the extent to which Volkart
controlled the market.
Nine years later, in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin,9 1 the Eighth Circuit failed to achieve the breadth of analysis displayed in Volkart.
Cargill, Inc. is one of the largest grain merchandisers and exporters
in the country. By selling huge quantities of wheat abroad, Cargill
radically depleted the supply of wheat in the Chicago area available
for delivery on May 1963 wheat futures, while taking a long position of 1,990,000 bushels. 9 2 Cargill then waited until the last fifteen minutes of trading to begin liquidating its long position. 9 3 The
resulting stampede by the shorts created an allegedly artificial
price. At the administrative hearing, the judicial officer adopted
the definition of manipulation used in the General Foods administrative hearing9 4 and found Cargill guilty of market manipulation.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the definition of manipulation found in the General Foods appeal, 95 modifying it to include artifical price stabilization. 9 6 The court determined that prices were artificially high by comparing May 1963
wheat price futures with the prices of May wheat futures for the
88. Id. at 58 n.9 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,

89 (1921)).
89. Id. at 60. For criticism of this reasoning, see Comment, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171 (1963).
90. 311 F.2d at 59.
91. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
92. Id. at 1160.
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
95. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
96. 452 F.2d at 1163.
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preceding nine years on the Chicago Board of Trade, and by
comparing the price of May 1963 wheat futures with the price of
cash wheat in May 1963-both patently unreliable methods of
determining whether the price had been artifically set.9 7 The finding that Cargill caused the "artificially high" price was based on the
high liquidation prices Cargill was able to obtain from the shorts.9 8
Thus, the court failed to acknowledge the dual origin of any given
commodity futures price-the buyer's bid as well as the seller's
offer-and therefore placed on Cargill undue responsibility for the
unnatural rise in prices. 9 9 Cargill argued that the Administrative
Procedure Act requires notice1 00 that Cargill's conduct violated the
Commodity Exchange Act. 1' 1 However, the court dismissed this
defense as was done in Great Western,102 stating that no notice is
required when the conduct in question is "willful."103 The court
examined the willfulness of the cornering by noting that Cargill not
only exploited the lack of deliverable supplies, 10 4 but also created the shortage in May wheat by selling huge quantities of wheat
abroad, albeit for bona fide sales purposes.' 0 5 Cargill argued that
the holding in Volkart is applicable, since Cargill's creation of the
shortage was the inadvertent result of bona fide sales and therefore
without manipulative intent.' 0 6 The Eighth Circuit criticized
10 7
Volkart and refused to consider Cargill's good faith defense.
Rather,' the court held that mere exploitation of such a shortage violates the Act, rationalizing that a contrary holding would encourage excessive speculation in deliverable supplies toward the end of
10 8
delivery months.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that while sections 6b
and 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act prohibit manipulation, traders are without guidance as to what constitutes illegal conduct. Because manipulative trading may closely resemble normal, legiti97. See note 71 supra.
98. 452 F.2d at 1169.
99. For criticism of the practice of blaming only the longs for the manipulation,
see T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 326-27; Hieronymus, supra note 74, at 54.
100. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)(1) (1976).
101. 452 F.2d at 1173.
102. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
103. 452 F.2d at 1173.
104. Id. at 1159-60. See also Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1962).
105. 452 F.2d at 1159-60.
106. Id. at 1172.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1173.
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mate trading, transgressions of legal bounds by "manipulators" are
often unintentional. Courts may examine the consequences of trading behavior-usually "abnormally" high prices accompanied by complaints from unhappy shorts-and assign blame to the traders who
ostensibly "manipulated" the market-usually the longs. Although
courts often fail to recognize that commodity futures market manipulation involves a battle of excessive speculation by both longs and
shorts, it is the financial harm suffered by the losing speculators
that gives rise to complaints against the winners. Consequently,
when the cases are adjudicated, courts focus only on the culpable
conduct of the winning speculators-only the winners are defendants. This approach ignores market realities and produces inequitable results.
PastAttempts to Prevent Manipulation
Fortunately, the methods of controlling squeezes and corners
are not limited to retrospective resolution. Because the factors
contributing to a squeeze or a corner fall into a general pattern,
these forms of manipulation can be anticipated and controlled by
preventive regulation. 10 9 Thus Commodity Futures Trading Com109. For example, there are limits on the size of any trader's speculative holdings in the futures market. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 150.1-.12 (1978).
The purpose of these limits is to prevent price movements caused by the sheer
volume of a trader's holdings. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 333-39. Such
limits are "a first line of defense against individual traders dominating the market or
engaging in activities that may cause price distortions, manipulations, corners, or
squeezes." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
for A Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3, CFTC v. Hunt,
No. 77-C-1489 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1977), affd, 2 CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,726
(7th Cir. 1979). In Hunt the validity of speculative position limits was challenged by
the defendants, who while not exceeding the speculative position limits individually,
were far in excess of the position limits collectively. The validity of the speculative
position limits was upheld, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ultimately upheld Hunt's conviction for violating government speculative
position limits on soybean trading. See CFTC v. Hunt, 2 CoMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,726 (7th Cir. 1979).
Until recently, daily speculative trading limits specifying the maximum amount
that a person could buy or sell during a single day in a single market applied to commodities traded on most domestic exchanges. 44 Fed. Reg. 7124 (1979); CFTC Votes
To Remove Daily Speculative Trading Limits, J. Commerce, Dec. 20, 1978, at 7, col.
5. In late 1978 the CFTC voted to remove all daily speculative trading limits. The
removal of daily speculative trading limits will now allow speculators to conduct
transactions of any volume so long as the existing speculative position limits are not
exceeded at any given moment. The CFTC based removal of daily speculative trading limits on the increase in market liquidity that would result and the minimizing
effect that increased in-and-out trading would have on the price impact of large or-
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mission (CFTC) regulation 1.41(f) provides in part:
(f) Temporary emergency rules. In the event of an emergency, a contract market by a two-thirds vote of its governing
board, may place into immediate effect a temporary emergency
rule to deal with the emergency without prior Commission approval...
(3) A temporary emergency rule may provide for, or may
authorize the contract market ... to undertake actions necessary
or appropriate to meet the emergency ....110

Examples of such action include extending the delivery period to
provide shorts with additional time to obtain the commodity from a
more remote location, and changing delivery points to neutralize
any local transportation problems hampering access to deliverable
supplies.'
If, in spite of such measures, the deliverable supply
cannot be sufficiently increased, more radical action may be taken.
For example, trading might be confined to the mandatory liquidation of contracts and new sales restricted to parties who have the
2
actual commodity to deliver pursuant to such sales."1
ders. See 44 Fed. Reg. 7124 (1979); CFTC Votes To Remove Daily Speculative Trading Limits, J. Commerce, Dec. 20, 1978, at 7, col. 5. Another method of alleviating
potential manipulative pressures is a track delivery rule, a typical example of which
is employed by the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri:
[The track delivery rule] permits deliveries of wheat in railroad cars in the
Kansas City market during the last thirty days of a delivery month. This
means, for example, that again were a tight situation to develop, persons on
the other side of the market could, within the thirty days, fairly easily
arrange to have wheat brought in on track in an effort to modify any developing problems.
Letter from W.N. Vernon, III, Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of
Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, to the Author (Jan. 19, 1977) (on file in office of the
Hofstra Law Review).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 1.41(f) (1978) (emphasis added).
111. Id. See COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 2177 (1976).
112. CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 2177 (1976). A typical mandatory liquidation
was effected as follows:
Any person who, at the close of business on November 23, 1977, directly
or indirectly owns or controls any December 1977 Coffee "C" contracts
(long or short) through any clearing member shall reduce the number of
such contracts (either by effecting liquidation trades or by making or accepting delivery of coffee) as follows: to 75% of the number so owned or
controlled on November 23, 1977 by the close of trading on December 2,
1977; to 50% of the number so owned or controlled on November 23, 1977
by the close of trading on December 9, 1977; to 25% of the number so
owned or controlled on November 23, 1977 by the close of trading on December 16, 1977; and to 10% of the number so owned or controlled on November 23, 1977 by the close of trading on December 20, 1977. In any case
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Commodity exchanges have long been aware of the utility of
emergency action 1 13 and most exchange bylaws authorize such actions. 11 That this discretionary action has not always been taken is
due less to the subtle effects of manipulations 1 5 than to two other
factors. First, exchange members lack self-discipline."16 They are
where the application of any of the aforesaid percentages to the number of
contracts so owned or controlled on November 23, 1977 results in a number
other than a whole number, the reduction required under the preceding sentence shall be the next smaller whole number of contracts.
Resolution Relating to December 1977 Coffee "C" Contract Adopted by the Board of
Managers of the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc. 2-3 (Nov. 23, 1977)
(Press Releases 77-7).
113. See 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 252-53. "In the opinion of one prominent grain trade man, who is a member of the Chicago Board of Trade, the anticomer rule now (since its amendment in 1921) 'absolutely prohibits any possibility
of a squeeze,' absolutely stops 'what is commonly known as a comer,' and 'will absolutely work.'" Id. at 253. A forerunner of this general procedure was adopted by the
Chicago Board of Trade as early as 1869. 5 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 178-79.
114. See, e.g., COFFEE, SUGAR & COCOA EXCHANGE, INC., Bylaw § 602 (1979);
COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., Bylaw § 408 (1975); N.Y. COTTON EXCHANGE, Bylaw
§ 1.38 (1977).
115. For an early legal opinion discussing the notoriety of some comers, see 5
FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 325 (quoting statement from Ex parte Young, 6 Biss.
(Bissel's U.S.C.C. Rep.) 58 (1874) (discussing general participation in corner by
members of exchange)). Although some comers may be effectuated in clandestine
manner through the use of several different brokers to obtain a dominant market position, see Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938), it would be impossible for
clearinghouses not to notice a greater-than-normal open interest as the delivery
month expires and, therefore, have reason for alarm. See generally J. BAER & 0.
SAXON, supra note 6, at 164-87; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 43-47. In any case,
the difficulties in determining market domination are not substantially different from
the difficulties in determining violations of position limits. For other indications of
the general notoriety of squeezes and comers, see G.H. Miller Case, 15 Agric. Dec.
1015, 1027-31 (1956) (reference to market letters from various brokerage houses
speaking of "concentrated buying," "the development of a squeeze," and "congestion of the delivery month contributing to the price rise"). In General Foods Corp.
Case, 6 Agric. Dec. 288 (1947), the Business Conduct Committee of the Chicago
Board of Trade called one of the respondents before the committee and "informed"
him that the "combined position" of General Foods and others "might tend to create
a comer and be in a position to dominate price movements." Id. at 299. And the
court in Fox Delux Case, 18 Agric. Dec. 582 (1959), mentions a market letter from a
brokerage house speaking of "a large merchandisng interest which has been conspicuous on the long side of December eggs." Id. at 597 (emphasis added). In Volkart
Bros. Case, 20 Agric. Dec. 306 (1961), vacated, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962), the court
indicates "that professional traders recognized the obvious fact that a concentrated
long would make or determine prices ... on that day." Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
The exchanges constantly receive information with regard to the availability of deliverable supplies and the identity of parties asking for or making delivery, and they
are in a position to know of the development of a squeeze or comer. See 17 C.F.R. §
1.51 (1978).
116. In all the cases involving comers listed in note 35 supra, exchange mem-
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more likely to be either conducting the manipulation 17 or seeking
to profit from the developing crisis than to be taking the necessary
steps to rectify the market situation before it becomes critical.
Thus when squeezes and corners occur, exchange members may be
found on both sides of the market late into the delivery period,
exacerbating the crisis rather than alleviating it.1 1 8 Second, there is
a need for objective standards for identifying potentially disruptive
situations. 119 Some traders are likely to challenge the objectivity of
bers were the defendants. See note 142 infra. See also 2 CoMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
Report Letter 80, at 4 (Aug. 25, 1978), which states in part:
After an investigation of the New York Mercantile Exchange's rule enforcement program, the CFTC Division of Trading and Markets has concluded that the exchange has the rudiments of a strong program in both market surveillance and trade practice surveillance, but that exchange members
must become more involved into [sic] the analytical phases of compliance
work.
...[Tihe Division commented that the extent and quality of member
participation in compliance matters was limited and that members did not
appear totally committed to discharging their disciplinary functions....
Investigations of trading practice ... were cited as being deficient in effective questioning of the brokers involved....
...Criticized by the Division was the disciplinary procedure of the exchange. Calling the procedure "neither prompt nor effective" the Division
required that a report be submitted . . . explaining the steps that will be
taken to accelerate the final resolution of complaints ....
Id. See also id. Report Letter 86, at 3 (Nov. 20, 1978), which provides in part:
The CFTC Division of Trading and Markets has criticized the rule enforcement program of the New York Cotton Exchange following a review of
that program ....
[Tihe Division called the Exchange's program disorganized, cursory, reactive, and reflecting little, if any, improvement from a similar review conducted in 1976.
Warning that enforcement action may be recommended, the Division
asked that improvement be forthcoming in the next several months in the
areas of market surveillance, trade practice surveillance, the handling of customer complaints, and compliance program record keeping. Along with
these problems, the Division noted particular interest in the Exchange developing an affirmative approach toward self-regulation.
Id.
117. See generally Fox Deluxe Case, 18 Agric. Dec. 582, 612-13 (1956) ("Until
the last few trading days, a substantial portion of these clearing members had positions on both sides of the market, although the concentration of long trading through
respondent Fox Deluxe was by this time quite apparent."). Such tactics by brokers
were suspected in CFTC v. Hunt, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,726 (7th Cir
1979). See Maidenberg, Questions in the Hunt Soybean Saga, N.Y. Times, May 2,
1977, at 54, col. 1. See generally cases cited note 35 supra. See also U.S. to Review
Role of Chicago Board Official, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1979, at D1, col. 3.
118. See note 117 supra.
119. See 43 Fed. Reg. 15,438 (1978), reprinted in 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP
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an exchange's ad hoc determination that trading prices have be120
come, or are about to become, "artificial."
PROPOSED SOLUTION

Because of the failings of discretionary ad hoc emergency action, the CFTC would do well to employ a consistent, predictable,
and objective method for identifying and alleviating emergency situations.
As a contract expires, so long as the deliverable supply of a
given commodity is neither depleted nor cornered, any inordinate rise in futures prices will always induce price-correcting short
(CCH) 20,578 (1978) (describing proposed rule 1.52, better known as "The Twentyfive Percent Rule"). Essentially, proposed rule 1.52 would limit the size of trading positions during the last 15 days of the delivery month to less than 25% of the
open interest, unless the exchange makes a determination that the holding is
"not likely to result" in disorderly trading. The purpose of the rule was to prevent
trading congestions during the delivery month "by placing an affirmative obligation on the contract market to analyze major positions and to take action if such
positions could adversely affect trading." Division of Economics & Education, Commodities Future Trading Commission, Summary and Recommendations on Proposed
Rule 1.52 (The "Twenty-five Percent Rule") 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Summary
and Recommendations]. On April 13, 1978, the Commission solicited comment on
the rule, to be received by July 12, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 15,438 (1978). The Commission received thirty-six comments on the proposed rule, including comments from
exchanges, commercial users of futures markets, and private parties. Thirty-five of the
responses to the proposed rule were unfavorable. The Commission decided to abandon the rule, largely because the "not likely to result in price manipulation or market congestion" standard could result in unneeded market intervention by an exchange that feared that failure to intervene might lead to ex post facto CFTC
enforcement action against the exchange. Among other reasons for Commission abandonment of the proposed rule was recognition that a more important factor than position concentration affects the potential for market disruption, namely the magnitude
of deliverable supplies. Consequently, a trading position of less than 25% of the
open interest could be disruptive if the deliverable supply is insufficient, and a trading position of more than 25% of the open interest might not be disruptive if there is
sufficient deliverable supply. See Summary and Recommendations, supra, at 5-9.
120. See generally Summary and Recommendations, supra note 119, at 12. Such
challenges are not likely to be successful: Courts apply a standard of liability for
exchange market intervention highly favorable to the exchange. In Compania
Salvadorena de Cafe, S.A. v. CFTC, 446 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court described the exchange's power to take emergency actions to prevent market disorders
as "without limit except that the Board must act in good faith." Id. at 691 (citations
omitted). Likewise, in Lagorio v. Board of Trade, 529 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1976), the
court stated: "[Me cannot believe that Congress intended ... to impose liability for
the good faith performance of regulatory duties ...." Id. at 1292. Nevertheless, an
exchange's successful defense against such a suit can be expensive. See Letter from
Bennett J. Corn, President, New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., to Jane K.
Stuckey, Executive Secretariat, CFTC, at 4 n.3 (July 12, 1978) (comments on proposed regulation 1.52) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
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sales from traders capable of profiting by delivering the actual commodity instead of paying the inflated liquidation price on the futures market. 12 1 However, once the deliverable supply of a commodity is depleted or cornered, traders are incapable of delivering
the actual commodity and further short sales only aggravate the
ensuing liquidation by already panicked shorts. 12 2 Thus, it is the
presence of a sufficient uncornered deliverable supply of a commodity that provides the market's inherent price-correcting mechanism. Without this mechanism, futures prices are subject to the
control of the dominant long and the market is void of integrity.
Therefore, while an exchange should be allowed to choose any reasonable method of averting an emergency situation before it develA
ops, 1 23 once an exchange ascertains that the deliverable supply12
of a given commodity is so dangerously low in proportion to the
amount of open interest that there is no realistic delivery alternative to liquidation, 1 25 mandatory emergency measures should be

121. See Volkart Bros. Case, 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 338 (1961), vacated, 311 F.2d
52 (5th Cir. 1962); Comment, supra note 89, at 174.
122. See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra.
123. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 1.41(f)(3) (1978).
124. For these purposes "deliverable supply" includes all supplies reasonably
capable of delivery within the prescribed grace period, see 1 COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 6315 (1976), and would exclude supplies controlled by long interests, since
those supplies are unlikely to be used to hammer down any upward price movement. Obviously computation of "deliverable supply" will be little more than an informed estimate in some cases, depending upon the relative ubiquity of the commodity involved. For example, it would be much easier to trace the availability of
deliverable supplies of "Maine potatoes" or "Kansas City wheat" (both of which
have concentrated growing areas and delivery points) than deliverable supplies of
"world sugar" with delivery points in the country of origin and growing areas in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, British Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Fiji Islands, French Antilles, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville), Republic of the Philippines, Reunion, South Africa, Swaziland, Taiwan,
Thailand, Trinidad, Venezuela, and the United States. See NEW YORK COFFEE AND
SUGAR EXCHANGE, INC., TRADING IN SUGAR FUTuREs 11 (1977). Fortunately, however, the more ubiquitous the commodity and the more delivery locations, the less
susceptible the commodity is to manipulation. See generally Hieronymus, supra note
74, at 47-50.
125. The following is a typical example of how such a determination is made
and acted upon:
In mid-November, concerns over the diminishing supply of tenderable
coffee available for delivery appeared valid as prices for the expiring December 1977 "C" coffee contract began to widen from those of the March
[1978] contract. Much of the coffee delivered on the July and September
contracts was still held either by those interests which [accepted] the deliveries, or sold to interests with declared domestic and export commitments. It
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triggered automatically. Normal trading should cease, and liquida-

tions should be compulsory. New sales should be restricted only to
appeared probable that this coffee, although certificated, was an uniikely
source for fulfilling the large open interest persisting midway through November. The estimated availabe [sic] deliverable stocks were only a small
fraction of that requiredto satisfy the large open interest.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and officials of the New
York Coffee and Sugar Exchange agreed that an extremely tight situation existed.
Day-by-day surveillance of the market indicated a developing problem.
...On November 21, the Commission met with Exchange representatives to
discuss a course of action. An executive session of the Commission and staff
was held on November 22 for further discussion of the December contract.
Most coffee interests had predicted the problem would not be alleviated
by new crop arrivals in New York until late December or early January....
Moreover, rumors persisted that a number of coffee shipments moving into
New York either did not meet grade requirements or were only marginally
within minimum deliverable quality standards for delivery on the "C" contract.
Commission and Exchange officials concluded that an emergency did,
in fact, exist. On November 23, the Exchange declared the emergency and
ordered trading for liquidation only. The Commission supported the Exchange action and also issued a formal declaration of an emergency and ordered a scheduled liquidation of the open interest.
The Commission said that on the basis of market surveillance data and
information reported to and collected by the CFTC and acquired from the
Exchange and other sources there was an emergency. There was a high level
of open interest relative to known or anticipatedsupplies of coffee deliverable under the December contract. There was a concentration among a small
group of traders both of positions to take delivery and of ownership of the
known deliverable supply. Seventy-five percent of the open interest was
held by three foreign traders. The deliverable supply on November 23 was
estimated to be sufficient to cover only 200 contracts, while there existed
1132 open interest contracts.
Effective as of the close of trading on Wednesday, November 23, the
Exchange was ordered to limit trading in the December 1977 "C" coffee
contract to liquidation only, and to direct and enforce the reduction of open
interest on the following schedule:
- Open interest as of the close of trading on December 2 was not to exceed 75 percent of the open interest as of the closing of trading on November 23.
- Open interest as of the close of trading on December 9 was not to exceed 50 per cent [sic] of the November 23 open interest.
- Open interest as of the close of tading [sic] on December 16 was not
to exceed 25 percent of the November 23 open interest.
- Open interest at the close of trading December 20 was not to exceed
10 percent of the November 23 open interest.
CFTC Advisory to the Media: Statement of CFTC Chairman William T. Bagley on
the Ordered Liquidation of the December "C" 1977 Coffee Contract on the New
York Coffee and Sugar Exchange 2-4 (Dec. 22, 1977) (emphasis added).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/6

24

1979]

REGULATING COMMODITY FUTURES MANIPULATION

Byrd: No Squeezing, No Cornering: Some Rules for Commodity Exchanges

parties who have the commodity available to deliver. 126 Enough
outstanding contracts should be mandatorily liquidated to restore a
"safe" ratio of deliverable supply to open interest. Trading could
then resume as usual until the "safe ratio" requires restoration.
Such mandatory liquidations and resumptions of trading could occur repeatedly until the delivery month expires.
Because mandatory liquidation of contracts precludes delivery
on those contracts, the shorts should bear some liability for any expenses incurred by the long as a result of the short's failure to deliver. However, if the long had no prior commitments for the certificated stock or if supplies were already owned beyond the long's
prospective needs, no harm would result from liquidation of the
contracts as opposed to delivery, and there would be no compensation. Furthermore, since a short hedger may enter the market not
for any predetermined period of time but for as long as the hedger's cash position needs protection, 127 such a course may result in
the hedger holding that position into the delivery month. Because
one of the main functions of an exchange is to provide a protective
mechanism for the hedger, 128 a hedger still holding in the delivery
month to protect a cash position, rather than to reap speculative
profits, should not be penalized. 12 9 In any case, the ceiling on the
compensation that would be paid to the longs by shorts would be
the added cost of importing deliverable supplies from a more remote location.1 30
Determining the need for mandatory liquidations should not
be discretionary, as it is currently under regulation 1.41(f)(3)(i), lest
the determination give rise to lawsuits by disgruntled traders
forced to liquidate; 31 more important, a discretionary determina1 32
tion might never be made at all.
To the extent that the necessary records are available, the

126. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.41(f)(3)(i) (1978). For text of this provision, see note 1
supra.
127. See generally note 16 supra.
128. See generally id.
129. See 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 253.
130. Otherwise the trader would obtain the stock elsewhere and deliver rather
than pay the settlement price. See generally G.H. Miller & Co. Case, 15 Agric. Dec.
1015, 1046 (1956), appeal denied, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
907 (1959); Great NV. Food Distribs., Inc. Case, 10 Agric. Dec. 783, 808-09 (1951), appeal denied, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
131. See note 120 supra.
132. See notes 116-117 supra and accompanying text.
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CFTC and the exchanges should compile statistics that disclose the
ratios of deliverable supplies to open interests on those occasions
when the rule has been implemented 133 and when known or suspected manipulations have occurred' 34 in the past. These statistics
should be supplemented with corresponding statistical data from
emergency situations that develop over an appropriate number of
months. 135 An analysis of these statistics would provide objective
and consistent criteria for establishing reliable estimates of the
points at which deliverable supplies are so diminished in comparison to volumes of open interest that the possibilities of delivery are
"too remote." Likewise, daily application of such established
estimates during the delivery month would provide objective and consistent criteria for identifying statistically safe ratios of deliverable
supply to open interest for every commodity traded on every ex1 36
change.
Traders should be afforded notice of the safe ratio as well as
continuous notice of the prevailing ratio of deliverable supply to
open interest for any given commodity during the expiring delivery
month. This information would be the focal point from which necessary guidelines for prudent trading behavior could be inferred.
Compared to the imposition of penal sanctions, the preventive
approach to corners and squeezes has several advantages. First, the
preventive approach, by making criminal prosecutions of manipulative squeezes and corners obsolete, renders moot the question
133. Exchanges commonly maintain such records. See, e.g., Lagorio v. Board of
Trade, 529 F.2d 1290, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976) ("In the case at hand, an affidavit by the
president of the Board lists nine instances between 1936 and 1955 in which the
Board took the same action it took here, and additional instances in which it allowed
liquidation sales only.").
134. A manipulation might be suspected where the cash price of a commodity
at the delivery point temporarily rose relative to the commodity's cash price elsewhere (due to its control by the dominant longs, as in a comer, or its temporary
unavailability, as in a squeeze), and then dropped back into line with the prevailing
cash price at the end of the delivery period. See Hieronymus, supra note 74, at
53-55.
135. The period of time for which such statistics should be collected would
vary depending upon the commodity and the speed with which a sufficiently representative compilation of statistics can be acquired. The judgment of what constitutes
a "sufficiently representative compilation" would be left to the exchange, the Commission, and their experienced statisticians.
136. Those commodity futures most susceptible to delivery-month congestion
or manipulation would be the first to yield the statistics necessary for determining
safe ratios. Conversely, those commodity futures least susceptible to delivery-month
congestion or manipulation would be the last to yield such statistics.
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whether traders have sufficient notice of those elements of a comer
or squeeze proscribed by the Commodity Exchange Act.
Second, the current practice of disciplining longs necessarily
comes after the fact; the distorted price has already adversely affected market operation. 137 Subsequent sanctions merely punish
manipulators; they cannot prevent manipulation. In contrast, mandatory liquidation of open contracts until the safe ratio is restored
prevents manipulation from occurring.
Third, if the squeeze or comer is expertly effectuated, it may
not engender the gross distortions in price that incite complaints, 138 yet nevertheless may impede performance of the market's basic functions.1 3 9 However, the safe-ratio method of controlling squeezes and comers would prevent even those manipulations
otherwise too subtle to incite litigation.
Fourth, the safe-ratio method makes no attempt to allocate
blame for the manipulation. Punishing longs for an evil that frequently occurs with the voluntary involvement of the shorts is inequitable. Price distortion is often as much a result of shorts
overstaying the market-expecting longs to sell their holdings to
avoid taking delivery-as it is a result of longs standing for delivery
to panic unprepared shorts into paying a higher price to offset their
contracts.14 0 Furthermore, punishing only longs after a manipulative squeeze or comer actually encourages shorts to hold their positions too long by giving them reason to believe longs will capitulate and liquidate early rather than face possible penalties for
market manipulation. When it is erroneous, this prognostication by
shorts works in a circular fashion, reinforcing the framework for
manipulation. Because the system proposed here does not allocate
blame, this kind of excessive speculation in the delivery month
would be curbed.
Finally, this proposal would deny the longs any hope of
137. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
138. Sometimes a "rise" in price can be bidden by not asking a price at the
end of the month as high as obtained earlier in the month, and, in turn, selling short
in a future month and using the accepted deliveries from the squeezed month to deliver on the short sales. Thus, the profit will not be determined by the degree of
price rise in the squeezed month but from the relative difference in prices effected
by the spread between the near and future months. See Comment, supra note 39, at
100-02. See generally Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. Case, 10 Agric. Dec. 783 (1951),
appeal denied, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
139. See note 24 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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dictating the shorts' liquidation price, thereby removing the incentive for cornering the market. On the other hand, the prospect of
the shorts having to defend their trading behavior to minimize
their liability to the long would deter the shorts from overstaying
the market.
Professor Hieronymus suggests that any processes that "reduce
the extent to which the full forces of competition are allowed to
work themselves out in price formation" will weaken the market's
integrity.' 4 1 Such notions falter, however, when, as with a successfully cornered or squeezed market, shorts are at the mercy of
overwhelmingly strong longs. Unrestrained competition in the
commodity futures market is desirable only to the extent that it
preserves the integrity of price formation. When free competition
leads to the total disintegration of competitive trading ability, appropriate measures should be taken to neutralize any excessive advantage accruing to either side of the market.
CONCLUSION

The inefficacy of self-regulation by exchanges was a compelling
factor 142 in the enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading Act
of 1974 and continues to be a source of CFTC concern; 1 4 3 therefore, any regulation which authorizes an exchange to decide
141.

Hieronymus, supra note 74, at 52.

142. Then-Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture W.R. Poage stated
in 1974:
On the floors of the exchanges where commodity futures are bought and
sold there is little or no real security for the customer despite the inherent
honesty of most brokers. Brokers, like many futures commission merchants,
number among themselves the most honorable of men. Yet, there are also
those who have been attracted to futures markets for their volatile environment and the hoped for ability to reap great profits in a hectic atmosphere
• . . often times taking advantage of that atmosphere at the customer's expense. Again, because not all commodities are covered under the present
Act, many attempts at self-regulation in those exchanges have been and continue to fail [sic]. Attempted investigations in regulated exchanges are often
characterized by the unwillingness of the investigating committees composed of exchange members to inquire too closely into the possible excesses
of their own brethren. In one or more unregulated exchanges it is continually charged that the owners of the exchange manipulate and evade the traditional rules for their own personal gain. Brokers, customers, and eventually the American ecomony suffers in this atmosphere of so-called
"self-regulation" where tradition and self interest has been allowed to displace the public interest.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 38 (1974) (statement of W. R. Poage). See
also note 116 supra.
143. See generally note 116 supra; see also note 119 supra.
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whether and how to deal with a squeeze or a corner is an anachronism. 144 Commodity exchanges need objective standards for identifying and preventing price manipulations through squeezes and
corners during the delivery month. In developing and implementing such standards, however, the CFTC must be careful not
to compound the problem. The CFTC should first conduct an empirical study to determine the effects of delivery-month trading disruptions on all market participants and the consumer public. Second, the CFTC should make use of all obtainable statistics to
establish the frequency of these disruptions. Third, the CFTC
should make a cost-benefit analysis of the safe-ratio method of preventing squeezes and corners and, in accordance with standard
rulemaking procedure, solicit public comment on its potential consequences. 145

There is a widely held opinion that the most convenient
method of dealing with delivery-month trading disruptions is for a
trader who is not prepared to deliver or accept delivery to stay out
of the delivery month. 146 However, there have been complaints
that mechanical avoidance of the delivery month by traders who
have no intention of making or taking delivery can reduce the efficiency of hedging, increase the hedger's risks, and result in
higher commodity prices to the consumer. 14 7 Furthermore, since
144.

For early criticism of the idea of allowing an exchange discretion over

the enforcement of its own anticomer provisions, see 7 FTC REPORT, supra note 11,
at 285:
The chief evil of corners and squeezes is artificial price changes and
price levels brought about by them. The need is prevention ....
The question about which there is room for difference of opinion with regard to the
anti-comer rule is not the moral and commercial soundness of the rule, but
whether its administration solely by a committee on the exchange is the best
practicable arrangement.
See generally note 113 supra. Although Professor Thomas Hieronymus criticizes suggestions for suspension of trading and fixed settlement prices, T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 6, at 327-28, he does concede that current rules may be in need of change.
He states:
Concept-ally, the courts are not a good place to adjudicate manipulation. However, the mechanism of the CFTC is much worse. Prevention is
the desirable solution, but it should be accomplished only in the rules....
Once the rules are made, the market should be allowed to trade out. If there
are repeated congested expirations the rules should be changed.
Letter from Professor Thomas Hieronymus to the Author (Mar. 2, 1977) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
145. See 17 C.F.R. § 13.4 (1978).
146. Interview with John M. Schobel, Jr., Vice-President, New York Coffee and
Sugar Exchange Inc., New York City (Jan. 4, 1979).
147. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974). See generally note
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commodity exchanges were developed to accommodate traders,
and not the reverse, notions of "solving" the market's functional
problems through problem avoidance seem unpersuasive at best
and could lead to dereliction of duty by traders, exchange personnel, and the CFTC-all obliged to free commodity futures markets
148
of operational defects.
Amendment of regulation 1.41(f) to provide mandatory liquidation of contracts, except for the delivery of the actual commodity, once the deliverable supply of a commodity falls below its safe
ratio to open interest, should be given full consideration by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. It may be the most predictable, impartial, and efficient means of freeing the commodity
futures market from the deleterious effects of manipulative
149
squeezes and corners.
Ralph T. Byrd*
24 supra. Premature removal of a hedge due to fear of delivery-month disruptions results in incomplete protection for the hedger's cash position. See generally note 16
supra.
148. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5(d) & (g) (1976).
149. Control of manipulation was a primary purpose for the development of
federal regulation of commodity futures trading. See H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-3 (1935); 80 CONG. REc. 6161, 6164 (1936); 62 CONG. REC. 9404, 9406,

9414 (1922). For a thorough discussion of early federal regulation of commodity futures trading, see Campbell, supra note 11; Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler

and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1977).
* Mr. Byrd is a 1978 graduate of the Law School.
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